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Abstract
Two datasets are combined to analyze a few standard impli-
cations of the theory of economic growth. Real GDP per capita
(RGDP) and the investment share (IS) are taken from Summers,
Heston (1988), the ratio of net external assets to GDP (=NAP)
are calculated by Sinn (1990). For the period 1970-1985, the
data for a sample of 116 countries are analyzed; in addition,
the group of industrial countries and highly indebted countries
is discussed.
One hypothesis suggests that low-income countries catch up
in the process of development, and that this is, in part, made
possible by the supply of capital from abroad. The data show
indeed that poor countries borrow more; however, they do not
grow faster than rich countries. Furthermore, those countries
which show relatively high growth are not large capital impor-
ters. In general, the ratio of net external assets to GDP does
not help to predict how fast a country will grow in the future;
this also means that high debt is not a burden in the sense
that a country will grow less than average. These results hold
for the entire sample and for the two subgroups of countries as
well.
A second analysis includes the investment performance. A
high investment share coincides with high economic growth in
the large sample, but not for industrial or highly indebted
countries. The hypothesis that a low NAP goes along with a high
IS is not supported by the data; the opposite is true for in-
dustrial and highly indebted countries. It seems that large
creditor countries (high NAP) also invest more at home.
In general, the analysis does not support the - plausible
- ideas of cycles of external debt or the stages hypothesis in
the balance of payments which suggest that low-income countries
tend to run a current account deficit while investing more and
growing faster than other countries; such performances seem to
be the exception. The fact that the level of net external as-
sets does not, per se, say anything about the strength of eco-
nomic growth implies that high debt does not mean that a coun-
try has large problems, just as the fact that a country runs a
high surplus in the current account is not - by itself - a sign
of strength. Therefore, conclusions for economic policy must be
based on more than just figures on net external assets or cur-
rent account balances.THE NET EXTERNAL ASSET POSITION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH - SOME
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS FOR 116 COUNTRIES*
I. Introduction
The issue of external debt-has been in the center of the inter-
national economic policy debate for many years. The debt prob-
lem of less developed countries and the advance (or, as some
would say: the decline) of the United States as the world's
largest debtor have been characterized as the major "imbalan-
ces" of the world economy finding their counterparts in persis-
tently high current account surpluses - and increasing net for-
eign assets - of a few industrial countries, particularly Japan
and West Germany. To many observers, these facts are market
failures. Only if they reflected differences in propensities to
save or in investment opportunities there would be "... no gua-
rantee that they will go away, and probably no economic reason
they should" (Tobin, 1987, p. 7). There are several hypotheses
why net external assets may change over time. The purpose of
this paper is to look at some general facts about changes in
net external assets and data related to economic growth. In
particular, I want to describe a few patterns and see whether
they are compatible with the standard implications derived from
the theory of economic growth and of economic development.
The data to be commented on are taken from the quite well-known
income comparisons for 130 countries by Summers, Heston (1988)
and the data recently calculated by Sinn (1990) on the net ex-
ternal asset positions of 145 countries. Due to some gaps in
2
both data sets the maximum number of countries is 116. In ad-
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Work-
shop on "Net External Asset Positions: Data, Methods, and
Interpretations" at the Kiel Institute of World Economics,
March 5/6, 1990.
1 These data are described and interpreted in Gundlach,
Scheide, Sinn (1990).
2
Either particular years are not covered or the data of inter-
est are not provided for a few countries.- 2 -
dition, two subgroups are of interest, namely industrial coun-
tries (ICs) and highly-indebted countries (HICs), with 21 and
17 members, respectively. Data are used for the period for
which both sets overlap, i.e. 1970-1985. The series of interest
are real per capita GDP (RGDP) and the percentage share of
gross domestic investment (IS) from Summers, Heston; from the
Sinn-databank, annual series of net external assets in percent
of GNP or GDP (it is this ratio that is defined as the net ex-
2 ternal asset position = NAP) are provided. These three series,
or their changes and growth rates over time, are compared in
the following section.
II. A Look at Several Hypotheses
1. On the relationship between economic growth and net external
assets
In an open economy, the level of net external assets may change
when the economy adjusts to temporary shocks. For example, a
negative real shock (harvest failure) which is transitory will
induce domestic residents to decrease their current savings.
This shortfall of savings can be met by an additional supply of
funds through the international credit market. Equivalently,
this economy will - if starting from zero balance - run a cur-
rent account deficit for a while. In this paper, I will,
however, concentrate more on long-run determinants; in that
case, external lending and borrowing may reflect different sa-
ving propensities, growth prospects, investment opportunities
and so on.
1 According to the classification of the International Monetary
Fund,
o
The stock of assets and liabilities are calculated for four
sectors of the economy. The total net external assets are
end-of-year data, calculated in US-Dollars. GNP (GDP) are an-
nual data, also in US-Dollars. For a description of the me-
thods and estimation cf. Sinn (1990).
Cf. Barro (1990) for an analysis of various cases.o
Standard (neoclassical) growth theory - if applied to economic
development - suggests that countries with a low real income
should grow faster than rich countries. This catching up, the
theory goes, is due to higher investment opportunities in poo-
rer countries; capital is relatively scarce, and the potential
rate of return is high. Temporarily faster growth is made pos-
sible - perhaps - by higher domestic savings, but more impor-
tantly by more saving of high-income countries where capital is
relatively abundant. In effect, this theory predicts that poor
countries should grow faster than rich countries, and that poor
countries should be in debt while wealthy countries should be
creditors.
As to the first hypothesis, it is well known from other studies
that the postulated relationship does not show up in the data.
In Figure 1, data for 116 countries are plotted for the level
of real per capita GDP (RGDP) in 1970 and the average growth
rate of real GDP for the period 1970-1985. There is no clear
negative correlation, so there is no convergence between coun-
tries over time. This may be surprising from the point of view
of those who focus on the "success stories" of countries such
as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Indeed, these
countries are in the low- to middle income range and are among
the five countries with the highest average growth rates in
this sample. There may be many economic reasons why this is so;
however, the sample also includes poor countries with low or
even negative growth rates, so the hypothesis does not hold in
general. For the smaller sample of industrial countries, the
relationship seems to be a little closer; GDP-growth is nega-
tively correlated with its level at the 5 p.c. significance
2
level. The same applies to the highly indebted countries. Al-
though the samples may be too small and the sample period too
See, for example, Romer (1989) who shows this for a longer
time period ("stylized fact" number 7). Lucas (1988) discus-
ses other empirical studies.
2
The regression results are summarized in the Appendix. The
OLS-estimates of the coefficients are heteroskedastic-con-
sistent as described in the TSP-package (1987).- 4 —
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Figure 1 (contd.)









































Level RGDP (70)- 6 -
short to really contradict the overall evidence, these obser-
vations may point at differences in the growth process of va-
rious country groups.
The second hypothesis concerns the relationship between the net
external asset position and the level of GDP: Do poor countries
borrow more? While this question may sound awkward with the
United States being a large debtor , Figure 2 covers 116 coun-
tries; the graphs show the level of real GDP and the ratio of
net external assets to GDP in four different years (1970, 1975,
1980, 1985). In the course of the 15-year-period, the spread
between the maximum ratios for creditors and debtors has in-
creased. In 1985, the largest creditor is Luxembourg with a NAP
ratio of 363.7 p.c; the largest net debtor, again in relation
to GDP, is Mauritania (222.6 p.c). Overall, there seems to be
a positive correlation between RGDP and NAP, low-income coun-
tries borrow more while high-income countries tend to be sa-
vers. This is revealed by regression results which show a sig-
2
nificantly positive correlation between the two variables. The
relationship does not, however, hold up for the two subgroups
of the
liers.
of the ICs and HICs where it seems to be more affected by out-
3
The idea that the US external debt poses a problem for future
generations in the US or for the world economy as a whole is
widely held. It must, however, be solely based on the abso-
lute size because in relation to GNP, that ratio is larger in
twelve of the industrial countries. For example, the ratio
for the US is by far surpassed by the ratio of countries such
as Canada, Australia, Sweden and Denmark. Besides, the notion
of a debtor has been questioned on the basis of problems con-
cerning valuation: Ulan, Dewald (1989) find that the US was a
net creditor in 1987 if assets and liabilities are measured
in terms of market value instead of historic cost.
2
At a significance level of 5 p.c. or smaller. See Appendix.
The graphs are not presented here.- Interestingly, not all of
the highly indebted countries can be considered problem deb-
tors at all. For example, Uruguay shows a positive NAP in
1987 (Gundlach, Scheide, Sinn, 1990). For several of the
other HICs, the net external debt is much smaller than the
usually reported data on gross external debt. Furthermore,
the measures of external debt concern only the book value; at
market value, several of these countries would probably not
be considered debtors at all.- 7 -
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Level RGDP- 9 -
An interesting connection between the two hypotheses discussed
above is the question whether high GDP-growth coincides with
more or less foreign debt. Is a relatively strong growth "fi-
nanced" by foreign savings? To test this, several ways are pos-
sible to illustrate the relationship between economic growth
and changes in the net external asset position. In order to
keep the number of graphs limited, I focus on the average
growth rate of RGDP between 1970 and 1985 on the one hand and
the change in the NAP between 1970 and 1985 on the other (Fi-
gure 3). Whether all 116 countries or just the 21 industrial or
the 17 highly indebted countries are considered, no relation-
ship between the variables can be found.
Taken together, these three findings suggest that low-income
countries are in a bad situation in the sense that, on average,
they show relatively high foreign debt but they do not grow
faster than high-income countries. All these results, however,
do not say anything about the direction of causality: Are the
poor countries in debt because they do not grow, or is their
growth so low because they are in debt? One way to shed light
on this issue is to look at the level of debt in a certain year
and the average growth in the following period. These data
pairs are combined in Figure 4 for the base years 1970, 1975
and 1980 and the respective five-year period that follows. The
graphs do not reveal that high debt is connected with lower
growth in the future or vice versa. Only for the first period -
i.e. for the NAP in 1970 and the growth of RGDP between 1970
2
and 1975 - there is a positive relationship. But the positive
sign contradicts the hypothesis of the "ideal" path. Further-
more, the correlation is not significant for the group of the
There is no significant correlation in the regressions. The
same analysis was pursued for subperiods of 5 years each.
Also in these cases, a clear relationship cannot be made out.
2
The coefficient is different from zero at a significance le-
vel of 5 p.c. See Appendix.- 10 -
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Figure 4; Net External Asset Position and Future Growth of Real
GDP
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NAP (80)- 14 -
industrial countries - with the exception of the first period -
and the highly indebted countries either. This may be surpri-
sing in the case of the latter group since these countries
obviously showed weak growth in the 1980s. However, this group
is not among those countries for which debt is extremely high
or growth is extremely low. Furthermore, the highly indebted
countries were growing at rates above average in the 1970s.
These results, though certainly not based on a thorough inve-
stigation of causality, do not support the view that high debt
is a burden that may prevent growth. A similar hypothesis is
discussed in Gundlach, Scheide, Sinn (1990). There it is shown
for a group of developing countries that the ratio of external
debt is highly sensitive to the measures which represent the
quality of domestic economic policy.
2. On the relationship between economic growth, investment and
net external assets
Standard neoclassical theory predicts that, in the steady
state, the rate of economic growth is not correlated with the
share of output devoted to investment; countries with high sa-
ving and investment will reach a higher level of real GDP, but
they do not grow faster. For intervals between steady states,
however, higher investment will lead to higher growth rates,
simply because of the shift to a higher path. For the 15-year-
period considered in this paper, such a relationship can indeed
be found. Figure 5 combines the average growth rate of RGDP
between 1970 and 1985 with the average investment share (IS) in
"Quality" is, of course, difficult to define; a measure which
represents domestic price distortions - largely due to gov-
ernment policy - is used to approximate the thrust of eco-
nomic policy.- 15 -
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Average IS (71-85)- 17 -
this period. Although the correlation is not very strong (with
2
an R of 0.22), the equation is highly significant and the co-
efficient is positive at the 1 p.c. significance level. Some-
what surprisingly, maybe, the relationship does not show up in
the smaller samples of the ICs or HICs. This supports the idea,
therefore, that the process, of growth in developing countries
2
differs from that in the industrial countries and, possibly,
in the other developing countries which are labelled HICs.
A hypothesis similar to the one in the first part of this sec-
tion concerns the relationship between investment and net ex-
ternal assets: Do countries with high investment borrow more?
If this were so, it would support the idea which is often put
forward, namely that savers are taking advantage of better in-
vestment opportunities abroad by exporting capital. Figure 6
shows the combination of the NAP in 1975 (or 1980 and 1985,
respectively) and the average investment ratio (IS) for 1971-
1975 (or 1976-1980 and 1981-1985, respectively). In general, it
cannot be said that big international debtors invest much at
home, or that big international creditors invest little at
home, the graphs and regressions do not reveal any significant
relationship of this kind. For the second and third subperiod,
there is even a positive relationship, i.e. high (internatio-
nal) savers even have a high (domestic) investment ratio.
A similar test supports the notion that the postulated negative
relationship does not show up in the data. The question is: Do
countries which are able to raise their investment share also
lower their net external position? In Figure 7, the changes of
the NAP between 1975 and 1980 (1980 and 1985, respectively) is
Summers, Heston (1988) do not provide investment data for
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Therefore, these countries are drop-
ped in the samples discussed in the remaining part of this
section, i.e. there are now 114 countries.
2
See this interpretation in Romer (1989, p. 62).
See the regression results in the Appendix.- 18 -
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Figure 7; Change in Net External Asset Position and Change in
Investment Share
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Change IS (76-80 to 81-85)- 21 -
plotted against the change in the average IS between 1971-1975
and 1976-1980 (1976-1980 and 1981-1985, respectively). The ge-
neral result is that more investment may go along with both a
rise or a fall in the net external asset position, there is no
clear-cut relationship between the two variables.
Given all these results - i.e. the non-existence of correla-
tion -, it would be surprising if a high debt now would indi-
cate more investment later. Indeed, Figure 8, which is the
equivalent to Figure 4 in the first part of this section, does
not show any relationship. Only for the third subperiod, there
2
seems to be a correlation between NAP and IS ; however, it is
positive and not negative as postulated. But this may also be
influenced by a few outliers (a few countries show an extremely
high increase of NAP). In general, therefore, it cannot be said
that a high level of debt reflects good or bad investment op-
portunities in the future. These results also hold for indu-
strial as well as highly indebted countries where investment
ratios differ substantially for the net external asset posi-
tion.
III. Summary and Conclusions
The hypothesis that the ratio of net external assets to GDP
does not, per se, say anything about the strength of economic
growth has found some support by the empirical analysis in
this paper. A large creditor may show more or less growth than
the average, a large debtor may have difficulties in servicing
its debt or may use the funds exactly in order to grow fast. In
a similar vein, high debt is not equivalent with large
1 As before, I look at NAP in the years 1970, 1975 and 1980.
These are compared with the average investment ratio in the
respective five-year period which follows those years.
2
The coefficient is significant at the 5 p.c. level. See Ap-
pendix.
This idea is extensively discussed by Gundlach, Scheide, Sinn
(1990).- 22 -
Figure 8; Net External Asset Position and Future Investment
Share
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problems, just as the fact that a country persistently runs a
current account surplus is - by itself - not a sign of
strength. Therefore, it is also not possible to derive policy
conclusions from the fact alone that a country is in debt or is
a big creditor. For example, the growth performance of the Uni-
ted States and West Germany was about the same during the
1980s, although both countries differed substantially with re-
spect to their net external asset position.
I have concentrated on very simple and general relationships
and have not tested specific hypotheses or hypotheses derived
from a complete model. Nevertheless, the stylized facts have to
be explained. Many of the postulated relationships cannot be
supported. The prediction that poor countries catch up in the
course of time and that this process is made possible by capi-
tal from abroad is at variance with the data: Low-income coun-
tries tend to borrow more but they do not grow faster. While
there are several plausible stories about the behavior of the
current account balance (or, what should - ideally - be the
same: the changes in net external assets) in the course of eco-
nomic development, they are not - at least on this general le-
vel - supported by the data. For example, the idea of stages in
the balance of payments suggests that a country runs a current
account deficit while investing more and growing faster than
2
other countries.
These hypotheses are certainly plausible and have intuitive ap-
peal; but such cycles cannot be observed for a larger number of
countries. A notable exception is the United States. This coun-
try did indeed catch up during last part of the 19th century,
accumulating foreign debt (running deficits in the current
This scenario is called the "ideal" path of economic develop-
ment in the world economy (Gundlach, Scheide, Sinn, 1990),
which indicates that it can rarely be observed in reality.
2
The idea of cycles of the current account balance is deve-
loped by Samuelson (1980). Similarly, Siebert (1989) descri-
bes the theory of a debt cycle.For an empirical test of the
stages-hypothesis see Genberg, Swoboda (1988) and Sinn
(1990) .- 25 -
account) and raising the investment share. Ideally, we should
have observed something similar for less developed countries in
recent years because they are the natural candidates for the
catching-up process and should therefore, ideally, be attrac-
tive for international investors. In some cases we actually did
(South Korea and others); but in the case of most of the now
highly indebted countries, foreign lending turned out - ex
post - to be a mistake because it did not lead to an investment
boom or faster growth in those countries.
Therefore, more information is necessary to allow an account
for these obviously divergent experiences between countries.
These simple correlations between a limited number of various
are not sufficient for this purpose. What was responsible for
the success of some countries, and why did others fail in at-
tracting capital from abroad? How important is the fact that
high growth in some countries could be achieved by sufficient
domestic savings whereas in other countries, foreign capital
played a larger role? Besides investigating the issue of market
valuation of external assets and liabilities, further research
would most likely have to focus on a larger number of determi-
nants of saving and investment. One obvious candidate is eco-
nomic policy in the broadest sense: How do governments compete
among each other to attract investment from abroad? Can we de-
fine and measure the quality of economic policy in terms of tax
policy, the provision of public goods and so on? Another pos-
sible channel for explanations is the degree of capital mobi-
lity and of openness of a country, especially because foreign
trade has played a major role in the growth success of several
countries, particularly in Asia.
Cf. the discussion in Gundlach, Scheide, Sinn (1990). By the
way, the US net external debt was at that time much higher
than presently, amounting to some 25 p.c. of GDP at the end
of the 19th century, compared to roughly 11 p.c. in 1989.- 26 -
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Heteroskedastic-consistent OLS estimates (TSP-package).- The
dependent and independent variables are those in the respec-
tive figures. The t-values are given in parentheses, the F-
value is calculated for the regressions. The significance
levels of 5 p.c. and 1 p.c. are indicated with * and ** for
the coefficient of the independent variable and for the F-va-
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